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Abstract—Cybersecurity in robotics is an emerging topic that
has gained significant traction. Researchers have demonstrated
some of the potentials and effects of cyber attacks on robots
lately. This implies safety related adverse consequences causing
human harm, death or lead to significant integrity loss clearly
overcoming the privacy concerns in classical IT world.
In cybersecurity research, the use of vulnerability databases
is a very reliable tool to responsibly disclose vulnerabilities in
software products and raise willingness of vendors to address
these issues. In this paper we argue, that existing vulnerability
databases are of insufficient information density and show some
biased content with respect to vulnerabilities in robots. This
paper presents the Robot Vulnerability Database (RVD), a
directory for responsible disclosure of bugs, weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in robots. This article aims to describe the design
and process as well as the associated disclosure policy behind
RVD. Furthermore the authors present preliminary selected
vulnerabilities already contained in RVD and call to the robotics
and security communities for contribution to the endeavour of
eliminating zero-day vulnerabilities in robotics.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A vulnerability is a mistake in software or hardware that
can be directly used by an arbitrary malicious actress to gain
access to a system or network, operating it into an undesirable
manner[1]. In robotics, security flaws such as vulnerabilities
are of special relevance given the physical connection to
the world that these systems imply. As discussed in [2],
”Safety cares about the possible damage a robot may cause
in its environment, whilst security aims at ensuring that the
environment does not disturb the robot operation. Safety and
security are connected matters. A security-first approach
is now considered as a prerequisite to ensure safe operations”.
Robot vulnerabilities are indeed potential attack points
in robotic systems that can lead not only to considerable
losses of data but also to safety incidents involving humans.
Some claim[3] that unresolved vulnerabilities are the
main cause of loss in cyber incidents. The mitigation
and patching of vulnerabilities has been an active area
of research[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] in computer science
and other technological domains. Unfortunately, even with
robotics being an interdisciplinary field composed from a set
of heterogeneous disciplines (including computer science),
not much vulnerability mitigation research has been presented
so far.
A variety of vulnerability archives and bug-tracking sites exist
already. These databases generally provide information that
allows security researchers to locate, mitigate or fix flaws in
their systems. Arguably, the most popular of such databases
is the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD)[10],
a U.S. government funded repository of vulnerabilities
compiled following a series of U.S. guidelines and standards.
NVD presents an archive with vulnerabilities, each with
their corresponding Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE)1 identifiers. Thus, NVD gets fed by the CVE List and
then builds upon the information included in CVE Entries
to provide enhanced information for each entry such as fix
information, severity scores, and impact ratings.
There are numerous vulnerability databases, both public and
private, however to the best of our knowledge, none of these
databases includes more than a few dozens of robot-related
vulnerability entries. Moreover, from our research, in most
cases, the information provided does not accurately facilitate
the reproduction of the flaws or its mitigation since reporting
schemes were not originally thought for robotics. In robotics,
system integration and the context become critical key factors
for the reproduction of any flaw or mitigation.
When reviewing prior work on vulnerability databases
in the context of robotics, this paper identifies the following
aspects that deserve further discussion:
• CVE robot-related results are scarce: At the time of
writing, the current CVE List provides some humble
results when searching for robot (43 CVE entries), Robot
Operating System (892 CVE entries though most, not
robotics related) or even the misleading ROS query (14
CVE entries). A closer look into the results led the
research towards realizing that information is scarce,
unstructured and in most cases insufficient for vulnera-
bility assessment. Finding robotics-related flaws with the
required accuracy is currently challenging. A similar ex-
ercise was reproduced in other archives of vulnerabilities
with similar results.
1Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) List CVE is a dictionary
of entrieseach containing an identification number, a description, and at
least one public reference for publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
CVE contains vulnerabilities and exposures and to date is sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and by the Cybersecurity
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) although it is not a database per se
(see official information). CVE it self does not contain the information in a
database manner, but instead, CVE List feeds vulnerability databases (such
as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)) with its entries, and acts as
an aggregator of vulnerabilities and exposures reported at NVD.
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• CVE reports require more details to be used (in
robotics): Taking CVE-2019-13566 as an example. Ex-
cept for the description and a few code pointers, this
particular entry provides very little information to help a
system integrator or manufacturer determine its relevance.
No details regarding the ”system under test” have been
provided, neither a exploit that confirms its exploitability
or a vector that allows to measure its severity according to
CVSSv3. Coming from the same group, we find CVE-
2019-13465 which at the time of writing is presented
as ** RESERVED ** though authors behind it2 already
disclosed that it is related to a potential iterator cause
buffer overflow. Similarly, CVE-2019-13445 presumably
published by the same researchers remains classified. For
a test engineer or security researcher aiming to reproduce
and assist in patching these flaws, more information is
required. The intrinsic system integration of the robotics
field demands for additional context such as the version
of the robot, or robot component under test (in this
case, the Robot Operating System (ROS)[11]). Examples
of additional information required may include a well
defined, context-specific and appropriate severity scoring
mechanism (to prioritize flaws) or a exploit to validate
its type and classification.
• Encouraging triage appears of utmost relevance:
Robotics is the art of system integration. Its modular
characteristic by nature, both in hardware and software
aspects, provides unlimited flexibility to its system de-
signers. This flexibility however comes at the cost of
complexity. The qualification of a security flaw com-
monly known as ”triage” seems of special relevance in
the domain of robots given its complexity. Establishing
a channel that favours an open discussion, where other
researchers might contribute is to us beneficial.
• Assisted reproduction of flaws: Working with robots is
generally very time consuming. From the authors’ experi-
ence and involvement in the constructions of robots, its an
inherent characteristic of the complexity of the field and
the trade-off obtained with its modularity. Mitigating a
vulnerability or a bug requires one to first reproduce the
flaw. This can be extremely time consuming, specially
ensuring an appropiate enviroment for its reproduction.
The authors consider that it would be beneficial to include
on each flaw ticket items that facilitate native Operating
System (OS) virtualization via technologies like Linux
Containers. By using a technology like Docker [12],
researchers will obtain relevant support in reproducing
the flaws leading to faster mitigations.
• Unfit severity scoring mechanism: CVE uses the Com-
mon vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) [13] to report
on the severity of vulnerabilities. As previously discussed
[14], CVSSv3 has strong limitations when applied to
robotics. Simply put, it fails to capture the interaction that
robots may have with their environments and humans.
2Refer to https://bit.ly/35FBcna
Vulnerabilities played a significant role in past attacks
affecting other areas [15] and can be judged as the major cause
for losses. Specially, the so called Zero-day (also known as 0-
day) vulnerabilities, security flaws that are unknown to, or
unaddressed by, those who should be interested in mitigating
the vulnerability. Conceivably, provided vendors released se-
curity patches for vulnerabilities promptly after discoveries,
0-day attacks as well as other attacks and damages using
these flaws would be significantly reduced. This demands
for manufacturers to be informed about new flaws affect-
ing their systems. However, according to past research [2],
most vendors in robotics are currently ignoring security flaws
completely. Within the security community, it’s commonly
accepted that ”creating pressure” towards more reasonably-
timed fixes results in smaller windows of opportunity for mali-
cious actors to abuse vulnerabilities. Several projects including
Project Zero3 from Google or the Zero Day Initiative4 from
Trend Micro have adopted this philosophy defining disclosure
policies with a maximum time deadline for manufacturers
to provide a fix before publicly disclosing the vulnerability.
Similar to some of these initiatives, the authors believe that
vulnerability disclosure is a two-way street where both vendors
and security researchers, must act responsibly.
As described by Zheng et al. [3], attempts to resolve this
dilemma have resulted in the development of vulnerability
disclosure policies. The disclosure of a vulnerability is the
revelation of a vulnerability to the public at large.
The authors acknowledge that one of the most—if not
the most—important task in security and particularly vul-
nerability management is minimizing the time window of
vulnerability. On this regard and in an attempt to provide robot
manufacturers and users a valuable source of information,
we design and construct a vulnerability database, the Robot
Vulnerability Database or RVD for short. Together with RVD,
and aiming to reduce 0-days from robotics, we also present an
attached disclosure policy thought for robot-related flaws that
minimizes the time window of vulnerability. This paper aims
to describe our approach and discuss our design decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces RVD and our design choices. Section III presents
some vulnerability results and section IV argues about our bias
in the compilation of such results. Finally, section V finalizes
with a series of conclusions and future work items.
II. THE ROBOT VULNERABILITY DATABASE (RVD)
The Robot Vulnerability Database (RVD) is a database
for robot vulnerabilities and bugs that aims to record and
categorize flaws that apply to robots and robot components,
including software and hardware. The database is freely
available at https://github.com/aliasrobotics/RVD and an open
source set of tools to manage the database are also available5
within that same repository.
3https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/
4https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/
5Undocumented at the time of writing
As first introduced by Ma et al. [4], this paper discusses the
design of the robot vulnerability database by arguing on a set
of relevant items.
A. Scope
The scope of RVD comprises all robotics hardware and soft-
ware systems, including complete robots but also individual
components.
B. Language and terminology
Information sharing becomes difficult without a common
language. The available vocabulary to discuss computer secu-
rity concepts is limited which leads to an overloading of terms,
i.e., a reuse of the same terms with varying scope and level
of abstraction. This was observed while reviewing different
and existing databases which not only overloaded but also
mixed terms such as weakness, bug and vulnerability leading
to confusion and misunderstandings.
RVD attaches itself to common language and standards as
defined by CVE List including the definitions of weakness,
vulnerability and exposure. In addition, we use the term
”flaw” to refer to all security-related errors. The authors
however found somewhat troubling that there was no
consensus across security organizations to define when a
vulnerability is a vulnerability, and not a bug. This paper
argues that this aspect is connected with the lack of resources
for reproducing reported vulnerabilities in most databases and
thereby accepting the so called ”theoretical vulnerabilities”
more than usually. Moreover, we question whether this
conservative approach of not only ”disclosing selectively” but
also ”disclosing scarcely” can be justified after recent results
[4], [3], [16], [17], [18], [19].
To ensure uniqueness of all robot-related flaws, unique
identifiers from CVE List are re-used within RVD and tagged
as ”cve”. Additionally, a unique and iterative identifier ”id” is
assigned to each new flaw. To categorize flaws, the Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is used.
To ensure future growth and adaptation, no further con-
strains have been applied (e.g. title naming convention). For
further clarification on vocabulary, authors refer readers to
appendix A where terminology is further discussed.
C. Sharing model
To understand the rationale of the data sharing model we
refer the readers to the 2nd Workshop of Research with Secu-
rity Vulnerability Databases [16]. In their report, Meunier et al.
argue about 4 different models for vulnerability data sharing,
namely ”Fully Available”, ”Centralized”, ”Federated” and the
”Balkan/Status Quo”. In this paper, It is briefly described and
discussed each one of those models below before introducing
our approach:
• FULLY AVAILABLE: Characterized by openness. The
database is completely open and anyone can access it
or add to it. Copies can be made and used freely. This
model offers the greatest use of access and eliminates
the need of logging activity or authenticating users. Users
can download the entire database seamlessly. The biggest
disadvantage of this model is that the funding of its
maintenance has to be sought.
• CENTRALIZED: Would entail a database of vulnerabil-
ities managed by some central organization that would
be in charge of defining the schema, data review and
consistency, funding, and policy. Access to the database
typically requires some sort of user subscription and
authentication. Advantages of this approach are mainly
the overall consistency and data quality control. The
downside is the scalability and organizational bias intro-
duced by the managing organization.
• FEDERATED: as in a loose union of several distributed
entities on a common task. Consortium, foundations
and similar operate in this manner defining a steering
committee. This model distributes responsibilities among
potentially qualified parties and ensures funding however
risks inequality by favouring partners of the federation
with more resources (e.g., big companies).
• BALKAN/STATUS QUO: Implies that each ”balkan” or
participant has their own database of vulnerabilities
which she or he is not willing to share with the rest.
Out of the research performed, and similar to [16], It has
been concluded that everybody is interested in vulnerabilities
including software vendors, consumers, security researchers,
malicious actresses, foreign governments, terrorists, etc...,
whether or not they would be willing to admit it publicly.
Objecting to the public distribution of vulnerabilities or failing
to acknowledge is effectively a proof of security-immaturity
of the players involved. This includes robot or robot
component manufacturers embarrased by flaws, pressured
by their clients or unable to cope with the security community.
RVD adheres to the FULLY AVAILABLE model for the
most part. This project hosts the database in Github which
requires no access control for consulting the information, but
demands it for contributions or extensions of any kind. This
is enforced to a) ensure a standard format of submissions,
b) favour the ease of use and c) motivate for-profit entities
to give back and contribute, generating credit, credibility
and costing them less than maintaining their own database.
This project proposes a GPLv3 license for the tools and
related-content to ensure enhancements and contributions on
top are feed back to the project.
By adopting this model, the falsification and erasure of
records controlled by a central entity becomes hard, because
valid copies may be saved by anyone exporting the tickets and
records. Moreover, the setup proposed, in our best intention,
provides great fault-tolerance due to the ease of making
non-confidential mirrors and duplicate copies.
In addition, and to empower privacy in advisories to
manufacturers or other interested parties, we leave the door
open for the integration of RVD with private (non-open)
sources of information. We prototyped and deliver a proof of
concept using a private source hosted in Gitlab6.
D. Taxonomy
In their report, Meunier et al. already highlighted that data
sharing will remain difficult (expensive) as long as there is
no agreement on what is relevant vulnerability data. This
easily leads to the need to define a common taxonomy for
vulnerabilities and a matching data exchange schema.
Both, the taxonomy and a matching schema are avail-
able within the repository. The taxonomy extends prior
work related to the classification of bugs in robotics,
namely the robust project7. The schema is available
at https://github.com/aliasrobotics/RVD/blob/master/rvd tools/
database/schema.py. It has been implemented using a simple
and easy to extend Python dictionary and enforced using the
cerberus library.
E. Access control
The authors acknowledge that the way in which the in-
formation describing vulnerabilities is handled is extremely
important. Vulnerability data is very sensitive and therefore
should be carefully disclosed. We propose a model for RVD
that implements access control for making contributions. By
favouring an authenticated disclosure, we hope to favour
responsible coherent actions. To simplify and lower the over-
head, we rely on Github’s native accounting. New tickets are
tagged with a ”triage” label and RVD maintainers collaborate
to triage them out at their earliest availability.
F. User interface
Similar to Access Control, User Interface relies heavily on
Github’s native features. By leveraging Github’s front-end,
RVD gets access to a well reviewed and tested front-end
designed for collaboration and participation.
G. Review process
Each flaw is subject to be reviewed at any point in time.
The severity of each flaw is calculated using two scoring
mechanisms: the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) and the Robot Vulnerability Scoring System (RVSS)
[14]. The later is the result of reviewing CVSS for the
domain of robotics. RVD implements both, CVSSv3 to
ensure compatibility with other databases and RVSS, to
provide additional useful information in the robotics context.
Maintainers associate each security flaw to a Github issue.
By leveraging Github issues and particularly, the e-mail like
interaction, we advocate for assisted flaw review, reproduction
and ultimately, assisted triage. Overall, management of the
tickets is coordinated by a set of maintainers selected from the
contributors of the database. The review of flaws is supported
by active use of labels which feed with information to the
Continuous Integration and Deployment (CI/CD) system.
6Refer to https://bit.ly/2slL3QE
7See https://github.com/robust-rosin/robust
H. Maintenance
As discussed in section II-C, funding is required to maintain
the database. In order to reduce the financial needs as well as
to ensure maintainers are relieved from the more dull tasks,
a series of automations are programmed into RVD. Using
CI/CD infrastructure, autonomous and semi-autonomous tasks
are introduced into RVD and implemented when applicable
as Github Actions.
At the time of writing, with different degrees of automation
and maturity, the database provides the following features to
simplify maintenance:
• It produces automatically updated reports (in the form of
a README.md) about its status upon new changes.
• It checks and validates conformance of new entries (or
existing ones subject to changes) with the schema
• It analyzes the database for duplicates using a scalable
fuzzy matching library that implements regularized logis-
tic regression augmented with Active Learning. Simply
put, it allows to train models that accurately identify
duplicates.
The authors are actively working on new additions to this
list. This should further reduce to overall effort to maintain
RVD.
I. Disclosure Policy
Coherently and to ensure timely responses from
manufacturers, together with RVD the authors propose
a disclosure policy. Unless specified, authors adhere to a
90-day public disclosure policy for new vulnerabilities after
the first communication with the vendor. Full text of the
policy is available on RVD’s official repository.
This disclosure policy is heavily inspired by Google’s
Project Zero and is recommended to all maintainers and
contributors to RVD. This paper calls on all contributing
researchers to adopt disclosure deadlines in some form.
III. VULNERABILITY STATISTICS AND RESULTS
With the aim of preliminarily discussing our RVD use and
feeds, we provide some further data on the entries held at
the date of publication of the present work. Table I presents
a compilation of vendors and the number of vulnerabilities
registered within RVD.
The total number of vulnerabilities per manufacturer pro-
vides some insights. From the raw numbers one can tell that
ABB has faced as many vulnerabilities in their robotic systems
as the rest of the other manufacturers combined. This aspect
is illustrated in Figure 1 and could lead one to think ABB’s
commitment with security far exceeds other vendors. It must
be noted however that several of these flaws have not been
addressed fully. For example, if one was to consider RVD#729,
it will be noticeable that the mitigation provided involves
stressing certain risks that the user gets exposed to, but no
actual mitigating change or update has been made effective.
Vendor count
ABB 61
Fanuc 6
Robotics 2
Universal Robots 5
DDS vendors (eProsima, ADLINK, RTI) 2
Acutronic Robotics 5
Vecna 6
WowWee 3
UBTech Robotics 3
PAL Robotics 1
SoftBank Robotics 4
Rethink Robotics 3
Asratec 1
TABLE I: Number of vulnerabilities contained in RVD clas-
sified by vendor.
In addition, several of the flaws catalogued for ABB are OT-
related and a closer look into them is required.
Fig. 1: Number of vulnerabilities recorded in RVD per man-
ufacturer
In order to further investigate vulnerability severity
by vendor, Figure 2a displays a barplot with the total
number of flaws per vendor, relative to their severity using
CVSSv3. In general, we see that except larger vendors of
robotic technology, most display a vast majority of critical
vulnerabilities according to CVSS. The authors argue that
the reasons behind this are two-fold: first and as is common
in the security domain, vulnerabilities with unclear or
unreported severity are flagged with the maximum. This
affects directly the flaws recorded for smaller robotic vendors
where researchers simply didn’t have the motivation (possibly
financial) to further pursue a security assessment. Second, the
most established (and larger) vendors of robotic technology
display a lower proportion of highly critical flaws. In the
authors’ view, while the data available is insufficient to
make strong claims, a tendency to propagate the criticality
percentage down can be appreciated as companies invest
in security. Particularly, the case of Acutronic Robotics,
which recently performed a security assessment (disclosing
partially) is of relevance to draw this conclusion. This
is further illustrated in Figure 2b where the severity of
non-scored vulnerabilities has been reversed.
In any case the authors acknowledge that the information
available is incomplete in all cases. It’s highly likely that
vendors do not disclose information about low criticality
flaws which could significantly change the plot.
IV. COMPARISON AND BIAS
To avoid biased conclusions, the authors assess the results
with a framework by which vulnerability statistics can be
judged and improved. Particularly, the method proposed
by Christey and Martin [17], maintainers of two well-
known vulnerability information repositories. According to
them, most of the vulnerability related statistical analyses
demonstrate a serious fault in methodology and represent
in some cases pure speculation aimed at justifying security
budgets and spending.
To self-assess the results, four types of bias are considered:
• Selection bias or what gets effectively sampled or se-
lected for study.
– for researchers, what software and methodology did
they use to test vulnerabilities.
– for the database, how the database discovers and
handles vulnerability disclosures from researchers to
vendors.
• Publication bias, what portion of the research gets
published in the tickets, and perhaps most importantly,
what does not get published.
• Abstraction bias, assigned to reflect bias in the process
the database uses to assign identifiers to vulnerabilities.
• Measurement bias, analyse potential errors in how a
vulnerability is analyzed, verified and catalogued.
– for researchers, failure to verify that a potential issue
is an actual vulnerability, or in over-estimating the
severity of the issue compared to how customers
might prioritize the issue.
– for vendors, prioritization of issues to be fixed or
under-estimation of the severity.
– for the database, how database’s tickets are filled
by analysts in terms of accuracy and completeness
(e.g. not filling the severity or the product description
details).
A. Selection bias self-assessment
In the current, initial phase of introducing RVD, the total
number of listed vulnerabilities is still small. This also means
that the conclusions here have an implicit selection bias. As
the database grows and the number and scanning intensity
(a) Non-scored flaws receive highest severity scoring. (b) Non-scored flaws receive lowest severity scoring.
Fig. 2: Entries of RVD summarizing relative proportion of Critical, High, Medium and Low scoring vulnerabilities for particular
vendors in the market, according to scoring provided by CVSSv3. 2a: non-scored flaws receive the highest severity scoring.
2b: non-score flaws receive the minimum severity scoring
of robots listed increases, it has to be expected that the
presented picture shifts. However, it seems to be reasonable
that established companies like ABB that have a broader
product range than young robotics-only companies, also em-
ploy more mature engineering processes in combination with
security researchers and thus have a lower number of critical
vulnerabilities (percentage-wise).
B. Publication bias self-assessment
Only high impact CVEs tend to be published by researchers.
Relatively few low rating vulnerabilities have been identified
to be public and added to RVD. This might be motivated
by researchers in robot security publishing exclusively high
impact (according to CVSS at least) findings. Also by the
lack of a precise VDB (Vulnerability DataBases) to adequately
triage robot vulnerabilities, or simply ”finding support” these
kind of systems is troublesome. The fact that robots do not
solely adhere to OT, but also to IT does not facilitate the
logging of vulnerabilities into VDBs.
C. Abstraction bias self-assessment
RVD IDs are provided for each robotic-related flaw,
regardless of the manufacturer or vendor of the robot (or
robot component). For example, a given vulnerable buffer
overflow in an arbitrary OpenSSL version used in robotics
should be classified with a single RVD ID ticket, regardless
of how many manufacturers are vulnerable to it. Both, CVEs
as well as unique RVD specific iterative identifiers (RVD
IDs) have been used within the schema for compatibility and
de-duplication. In addition, a semi-autonomous de-duplication
mechanism based in regularized logistic regression augmented
with human input (Active Learning) has been used to avoid
duplicates of any kind.
The authors express that to the best of their knowledge, RVD
has been designed to avoid being subject to abstraction bias.
D. Measurement bias self-assessment
This paper has found that the method for investigation
is often very poorly reported in most of the robot-related
vulnerabilities discovered. This paper advocates for more
detailed reports, including the environment to reproduce the
finding. If vulnerabilities cannot be reproduced, it is very
difficult to assign an accurate severity. To this end, there is a
relevant measurement bias in the existing dataset.
Efforts have been dedicated to reduce such bias by re-
classiying, de-deduplicating and enhancing the scoring
mechanism introducing a robot-specific scoring system
(RVSS). RVSS scoring remains more conservative when it
comes to safety aspects in robotics, as it underrates severity
in data related vulnerabilities and overrates those that have or
might have an effective Safety impact, in comparison to CVSS.
When compared to other existing robotics-related vulnerability
reports (e.g. CVE-2019-13566, CVE-2019-13465 or CVE-
2019-13445), entries in RVD appear more complete and
provide means for its discussion, further improvement and
reproduction, when possible. Still, authors acknowledge that
much work is left to be done on the triage aspect and future
work will focus there.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented the Robot Vulnerability Database
along with the processes and tools for the proposed use
of RVD. It has been argued that a vulnerability repository
dedicated to robotics is required to account for the complexity
and special characteristics of robots that are not reflected in
general, IT and OT-focused vulnerability collection projects.
RVD aims to enhance existing vulnerability enumerations like
CVE List with information specific to robotics. It also aims to
provide information on vulnerability reproduction to increase
the overall quality of the collected items. By using machine-
readable formats, RVD enables a high degree of automation
in processing and validation as well as querying of database
entries. This greatly reduces the effort in maintenance that
would otherwise become unbearable as the adoption of RVD
increases.
A total of 110 vulnerabilities have been recorded a the
time of writing. Preliminary statistics on RVD contents
have been presented highlighting that already in its current
initial stage, it already contains a collection of highly critical
security issues across a very broad range of manufacturers.
Moreover, plots show a correlation between the involvement
of a manufacturer with security (funding security researchers,
publishing advisories, etc.) and the spread of the severity of
their related vulnerabilities.
As more data becomes available authors will re-iterate
on their conclusions and produce more visualizations. Future
work will also include, but not limited to the items listed
below:
• Disclose flaws of open source robot components (e.g.
ROS and ROS 2)
• A higher degree of automation is expected to help support
in the task of creating the security pipelines and mainte-
nance of RVD
• Further work is foreseen to elaborate on difficulties
on triage of Robot Vulnerabilities, including the repro-
ducibility of cyber issues.
• An effort is needed to foster the differentiation of OT
technologies, ICS and robotics. There is still scarce data
on robots.
The authors want to explicitly call upon the robotics and
cybersecurity communities to engage with the topic of robot
cybersecurity and use RVD as an essential tool to jointly
proceed towards a future with secure robots.By no means the
authors would like to encourage uncontrolled tampering with
running robotic devices, as this may result into serious safety
hazards.
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APPENDIX A
TERMINOLOGY
Commonly [20], a software bug is an error, flaw, failure or
fault in a computer program or system that causes it to produce
an incorrect or unexpected result, or to behave in unintended
ways.
A software weakness however is an error that can lead to
software vulnerabilities according to the Common Weakness
Enumeration [21]. The same source fines a software vulner-
ability as a mistake in software that can be directly used by a
hacker to gain access to a system or network while ISO/IEC
27001 proposes the following definition for vulnerability: bug
of an asset or control that can be exploited by one or more
threats.
Finally, CVE defines [22] a software exposure as a system
configuration issue or a mistake in software that allows access
to information or capabilities that can be used by a hacker as
a stepping-stone into a system or network.
Discussion and interpretation
From the definitions above, it seems reasonable to associate
use interchangeably the terms bug and flaw when referring
to software issues. In addition, the word weakness seems
applicable to any flaw that might turn into a vulnerability
however it must be noted that (from the text above) a
vulnerability ”must be exploited”. Based on this, a clear
difference can be established classifying flaws with no
potential to be exploitable as bugs and flaws potentially
exploitable as vulnerabilities. Orthogonal to this appear
exposures which refer to misconfigurations that allows
attackers to establish an attack vector in a system.
Beyond pure logic, an additional piece of information
that comes out of researching other security databases is that
most security-oriented databases do not distinguish between
bugs (general bugs) and weaknesses (security bugs).
Based in all of the above, we interpret and make the
following assumptions for RVD:
• unless specified, all flaws are ”security flaws” (an alter-
native could be a quality flaw). Flaw is used as a general
term to refer to any possible security error.
• bug and weakness refer to the same thing and can be used
interchangeably
• a bug is a flaw with potential to be exploited (but
unconfirmed exploitability)
• vulnerability is a bug that is exploitable.
• exposure is a configuration error or mistake in software
that without leading to exploitation, leaks relevant infor-
mation that empowers an attacker.
APPENDIX B
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RVD, CVE, AND THE NVD?
To understand the relationship between these terms, we
propose below some definitions:
• Robot Vulnerability Database (RVD) is a database for
robot vulnerabilities and bugs that aims to record and cat-
egorize flaws that apply to robot and robot components.
RVD is created as a community-contributed and open
archive of robot security flaws. It is originally created
and sponsored by Alias Robotics.
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) List
CVE is an archive (dictionary according to the official
source) of entrieseach containing an identification num-
ber, a description, and at least one public referencefor
publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. CVE con-
tains vulnerabilities and exposures and is sponsored by
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cy-
bersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
It is not a database (see official information). CVE
List feeds vulnerability databases (such as the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD)) with its entries and also
acts as an aggregator of vulnerabilities and exposures
reported at NVD.
• U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is the U.S.
government repository of standards based vulnerability
management data. It presents an archive with vulnera-
bilities, each with their corresponding CVE identifiers.
NVD gets fed by the CVE List and then builds upon the
information included in CVE Entries to provide enhanced
information for each entry such as fix information, sever-
ity scores, and impact ratings.
RVD does not aim to replace CVE but to complement it
for the domain of robotics. RVD aims to become CVE-
compatible by tackling aspects such scope and impact of
the flaws (through a proper severity scoring mechanism
for robots), information for facilitating mitigation, detailed
technical information and more.
When compared to other vulnerability databases, RVD
aims to differentiate itself by focusing on the following:
• robotics specific: RVD aims to focus and capture robot-
specific flaws. If a flaw does not end-up applying to a
robot or a robot component then it should not be recorded
here.
• community-oriented: while at the time of wrriting RVD
is sponsored by Alias Robotics, it aims to become
community-managed and contributed.
• facilitates reproducing robot flaws: Working with
robots is very time consuming. Mitigating a vulnerability
or a bug requires one to first reproduce the flaw. This
can be extremely time consuming. Not so much pro-
viding the fix itself but ensuring that your environment
is appropriate. At RVD, each flaw entry should aim to
include a field named as reproduction-image. This should
correspond with the link to a Docker image that should
allow anyone reproduce the flaw easily.
• robot-specific severity scoring: opposed to CVSS which
has strong limitations when applied to robotics, RVD uses
RVSS, a robot-specific scoring mechanism.
As part of RVD, we encourage security researchers to file
CVE Entries and use official CVE identifiers for their reports
and discussions at RVD.
APPENDIX C
RVD SCHEMA
1 SCHEMA = {
2 ’id’: {
3 ’required’: True,
4 ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type’: ’
number’}],
5 # ’type’: ’number’,
6 ’empty’: False,
7 ’min’: 0,
8 # ’max’: 100
9 ’default_setter’:
10 lambda doc: 0,
11 # ’default’: 0
12 },
13 ’title’: {
14 ’required’: True,
15 ’type’: ’string’,
16 ’maxlength’: 100, # extend beyond 65 to
cope with a few tickets
17 },
18 ’type’: {
19 ’required’: True,
20 ’type’: ’string’,
21 ’allowed’: [’bug’, ’weakness’, ’
vulnerability’, ’exposure’],
22 ’default_setter’:
23 lambda doc: ’bug’
24 },
25 ’description’: {
26 ’required’: True,
27 ’type’: ’string’,
28 # ’empty’: False,
29 # ’default_setter’:
30 # lambda doc: None,
31 },
32 ’cwe’: {
33 ’required’: True,
34 ’type’: ’string’,
35 # ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type’: ’
number’}],
36 # # Changed in version 0.7: nullable is
valid on
37 # # fields lacking type definition.
38 # ’nullable’: True,
39 ’regex’: ’ˆCWE-[0-9]*.*$|ˆNone$’,
40 ’default_setter’:
41 lambda doc: ’None’
42 },
43 ’cve’: {
44 ’required’: True,
45 ’type’: ’string’,
46 ’regex’: ’ˆCVE-[0-9]*-[0-9]*$|ˆNone$’, #
CVE-2019-13585
47 ’default_setter’:
48 lambda doc: ’None’
49 },
50 ’keywords’: {
51 ’required’: True,
52 ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type’: ’list
’}],
53 ’default_setter’:
54 lambda doc: ’’
55 },
56 ’system’: {
57 ’required’: True,
58 ’type’: ’string’,
59 ’default_setter’:
60 lambda doc: ’’
61 },
62 ’vendor’: {
63 ’required’: True,
64 ’type’: ’string’,
65 ’nullable’: True,
66 ’default_setter’:
67 lambda doc: None
68 },
69 ’severity’: {
70 ’required’: True,
71 ’schema’: {
72 ’rvss-score’: {
73 ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type
’: ’number’}],
74 ’regex’: ’ˆNone$’,
75 ’min’: 0,
76 ’max’: 10,
77 ’required’: True,
78 },
79 ’rvss-vector’: {
80 ’type’: ’string’,
81 ’required’: True,
82 },
83 ’severity-description’: {
84 ’type’: ’string’,
85 ’required’: True,
86 },
87 ’cvss-score’: {
88 ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type
’: ’number’}],
89 ’regex’: ’ˆNone$’,
90 ’min’: 0,
91 ’max’: 10,
92 ’required’: False,
93 },
94 ’cvss-vector’: {
95 ’type’: ’string’,
96 ’required’: False,
97 },
98 }
99 },
100 ’links’: {
101 ’required’: False,
102 ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type’: ’list
’}],
103 # ’regex’: ’ˆNone$’,
104 ’default_setter’:
105 lambda doc: ’None’,
106 },
107 ’bug’: {
108 ’rename’: ’flaw’
109 },
110 ’flaw’: {
111 ’required’: True,
112 ’schema’: {
113 ’phase’: {
114 ’required’: True,
115 ’type’: ’string’,
116 ’allowed’: [’programming-time’, ’
build-time’, ’compile-time’,
117 ’deployment-time’, ’
runtime’, ’runtime-initialization’,
118 ’runtime-operation’, ’
testing’, ’unknown’],
119 ’default_setter’:
120 lambda doc: ’unknown’
121 },
122 ’specificity’: {
123 ’required’: True,
124 ’type’: ’string’,
125 # ’allowed’: [’general issue’, ’
robotics specific’,
126 # ’ROS-specific’, ’
subject-specific’, ’N/A’],
127 ’default_setter’:
128 lambda doc: ’N/A’,
129 },
130 ’architectural-location’: {
131 ’required’: True,
132 ’type’: ’string’,
133 ’allowed’: [’application-specific
code’, ’application-specific’,
134 ’platform-code’, ’
platform code’, ’ROS-specific’,
135 ’third-party’, ’N/A’],
136 ’default_setter’:
137 lambda doc: ’N/A’,
138 },
139 ’application’: {
140 ’type’: ’string’,
141 ’required’: True,
142 ’default_setter’:
143 lambda doc: ’N/A’,
144 },
145 ’subsystem’: {
146 ’type’: ’string’,
147 ’required’: True,
148 ’regex’:
149 ’ˆ(sensing|actuation|
communication|cognition|UI|power).*$|ˆN/A$|.*’,
150 # TODO: modify this value and
enforce the subsystem’s policies
151 # ’ˆ(sensing|actuation|
communication|cognition|UI|power).*$|ˆN/A$’,
152 ’default_setter’:
153 lambda doc: ’N/A’,
154 },
155 ’package’: {
156 ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type
’: ’list’}],
157 # ’type’: ’string’,
158 ’default_setter’:
159 lambda doc: ’N/A’,
160 },
161 ’languages’: {
162 ’required’: True,
163 ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type
’: ’list’}],
164 # ’type’: ’string’,
165 ’allowed’: [’Python’, ’python’, ’
cmake’, ’CMake’, ’C’, ’C++’,
166 ’package.xml’, ’launch
XML’, ’URScript’, ’shell’,
167 ’msg’, ’srv’, ’xacro’, ’
urdf’, ’None’, ’rosparam YAML’,
168 ’XML’, ’ASCII STL’, ’N/A
’, ’YAML’, ’Package XML’],
169 ’default_setter’:
170 lambda doc: ’None’
171 },
172 ’date-detected’: {
173 ## TODO: review this and force date
check
174 # ’type’: ’date’,
175 ’type’: ’string’,
176 ’required’: True,
177 # ’coerce’: ’datecoercer’,
178 ’default_setter’:
179 lambda doc: ’’
180 },
181 ’detected-by’: {
182 ’type’: ’string’,
183 ’required’: True,
184 ’default_setter’:
185 lambda doc: ’’
186 },
187 ’detected-by-method’: {
188 ’type’: ’string’,
189 ’required’: True,
190 ’allowed’: [’build system’, ’
compiler’,
191 ’assertions’, ’runtime
detection’, ’runtime crash’
192 ’testing violation’, ’
testing static’,
193 ’testing dynamic’, ’N/A’
],
194 ’default_setter’:
195 lambda doc: ’N/A’
196 },
197 ’date-reported’: {
198 ’type’: ’string’,
199 ’required’: True,
200 ’default_setter’:
201 lambda doc: ’’
202 },
203 ’reported-by’: {
204 ’type’: ’string’,
205 ’required’: True,
206 ’default_setter’:
207 lambda doc: ’’
208 },
209 ’reported-by-relationship’: {
210 ’type’: ’string’,
211 ’required’: True,
212 ’allowed’: [’guest user’, ’
contributor’,
213 ’member developer’, ’
automatic’,
214 ’security researcher’, ’
N/A’],
215 ’default_setter’:
216 lambda doc: ’N/A’
217 },
218 ’issue’: {
219 ’type’: ’string’,
220 ’default_setter’:
221 lambda doc: ’’,
222 },
223 ’reproducibility’: {
224 ’type’: ’string’,
225 ’required’: True,
226 ’default_setter’:
227 lambda doc: ’’,
228 },
229 ’trace’: {
230 ’type’: ’string’,
231 ’required’: True,
232 ’default_setter’:
233 lambda doc: ’’,
234 },
235 ’reproduction’: {
236 ’type’: ’string’,
237 ’required’: True,
238 ’default_setter’:
239 lambda doc: ’’
240 },
241 ’reproduction-image’: {
242 ’type’: ’string’,
243 ’required’: True,
244 ’default_setter’:
245 lambda doc: ’’
246 },
247 }
248 },
249 ’exploitation’: {
250 ’required’: True,
251 ’default_setter’:
252 lambda doc: ’’,
253 ’schema’: {
254 ’description’: {
255 ’required’: True,
256 ’type’: ’string’,
257 ’default_setter’:
258 lambda doc: ’’
259 },
260 ’exploitation-image’: {
261 ’required’: True,
262 ’type’: ’string’,
263 ’default_setter’:
264 lambda doc: ’’
265 },
266 ’exploitation-vector’: {
267 ’required’: True,
268 ’type’: ’string’,
269 ’default_setter’:
270 lambda doc: ’’
271 },
272 }
273 },
274 ’fix’: {
275 ’rename’: ’mitigation’
276 },
277 ’mitigation’: {
278 ’required’: True,
279 ’schema’: {
280 ’description’: {
281 ’required’: True,
282 ’type’: ’string’,
283 ’default_setter’:
284 lambda doc: ’’
285 },
286 ’pull-request’: {
287 ’oneof’: [{’type’: ’string’}, {’type
’: ’number’}],
288 # ’type’: ’string’,
289 ’default_setter’:
290 lambda doc: ’’
291 },
292 }
293 },
294 }
